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severely limiting the defendant's ability to waive the double jeopardy defense,21 it is suggested that, upon its next confrontation
with the issue, the Court adopt more definite guidelines for determining the existence of a waiver.
Gene A. Capello

Absent an inquiry by the trial court and upon a demonstration of
possible conflict, new trial required for jointly represented
defendants
Due to the frequent inability of one attorney to protect adequately conflicting interests of criminal codefendants, 217 joint reprecriminal proceedings against a defendant. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974);
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976)(right to counsel);
People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167, 204 N.E.2d 846, 256 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1965) (privilege
against self-incrimination). Moreover, the double jeopardy claim benefits from "every reasonable presumption against . . . waiver . . . ." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70
(1942). Compare Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972) with United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S.
463 (1964).
216 Restricting the instances in which the double jeopardy claim can be waived could
encourage defendants to use the defense as a "sword" rather than properly as a "shield"
against harassment by the sovereign. See People v. Key, 87 Misc. 2d 262, 266, 391 N.Y.S.2d
781, 784 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1976). For example, in order to preclude further proceedings against him, a defendant might wait until jeopardy attached to claim error, which,
if corrected earlier, would have prevented a double jeopardy violation. Id. In Key, the defendant waited until jeopardy attached before moving to dismiss the information for insufficiency. Id. at 263, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 783. The People's motion for reargument was granted,
but the trial court denied the relief sought because of the double jeopardy implications. Id.
The appellate term reversed, holding that since the defendant was aware of the defect and
could have moved to dismiss the information prior to the attachment of jeopardy, he waived
his right to claim double jeopardy. Id. at 266, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 784. See also People v. Woods,
93 Misc. 2d 426, 429, 402 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1978).
2" For a full discussion of the types of conflict involved in joint representation of multiple defendants, see Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MinN. L. REv. 119,
125-35 (1978); Girgenti, Problems of Joint Representation of Defendants in a Criminal Case,
54 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55, 61-67 (1979); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases:
A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REv. 939, 941-50 (1978). Typically, claims of conflict allege
either counsel's failure to act in favor of one defendant for fear of implicating the other, see,
e.g., People v. Coleman, 42 N.Y.2d 500, 369 N.E.2d 742, 399 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1977); People v.
Sprinkler, 16 App. Div. 2d 705, 227 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2d Dep't 1962), or affirmative steps taken
by counsel inuring to the benefit of one client while severely damaging the case of another,
see People v. Dell, 60 App. Div. 2d 18, 400 N.Y.S.2d 236 (4th Dep't 1977). In the latter
instance, one commentator has noted, the defense attorney's role becomes prosecutorial in
nature. See Geer, supra, at 133. In addition to the conflicting interests of multiple defendants that develop during the actual trial, are those that occur at the plea bargaining, pretrial, or sentencing stages of the criminal prosecution. See Girgenti, supra, at 61-67. Moreo-

19801

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

sentation of defendants is highly suspect of giving rise to ineffective
assistance of counsel. 28 In order to protect a defendant from conflicts inherent in joint representation and balance them with his
right to choose his own counsel, 29 a trial court is required to determine on the record whether the decision to share counsel with a
codefendant and decline his right to separate counsel was made
2 2 Recently, in People
with full knowledge of its potential hazards.1
ver, many defenses at a trial may be "lost" due to counsel's attempt to minimize the existence of conflict. See Geer, supra, at 125-28; Lowenthal, supra, at 979.
2,S See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978); People v. Gomberg, 38
N.Y.2d 307, 312, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1975); Geer, supra note 217, at
121; Lowenthal, supra note 217, at 939. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST.
art. 1, .§ 6; CPL § 210.15(2) (1971).
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), over the objections of the defendant
Glasser, the trial court assigned his lawyer to represent a codefendant simultaneously. Id. at
69. The-Court reversed Glasser's conviction, finding that the lawyer's representation of Glasser was "not as effective as it might have been" had the assignment not been made. Id. at
76. Although the Court stated that "[tihe right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial," id., it declined to reverse the convictions of Glasser's codefendant, concluding that the record clearly established that he had suffered no prejudice. Id.
at 77.
The ambiguity surrounding the amount of prejudice a defendant must demonstrate in
order to establish a denial of his right to the effective assistance of counsel was partially
clarified in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). In Holloway, the lawyer for the three
codefendants applied for a pre-trial order appointing separate attorneys for each defendant,
which was refused by the trial court. Claiming that he could not effectively cross-examine
each defendant as he was obliged to do as counsel for the other defendants, the lawyer reasserted his request at trial, but it was denied again by the court. Id. at 478. The Supreme
Court reversed the convictions, holding that it was error for the trial court to disregard the
defendants' requests for separate counsel, since the court had notice of the "possibility" of a
conflict of interest. See id. at 484. The Holloway Court enunciated the rule that once a
defendant objects to joint representation on the ground that a conflict of interest exists, the
defendant need not show prejudice in order to obtain a reversal because prejudice will be
presumed. Id. at 489.
229 See People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769,
773-74 (1975).
21 Id. at 313-14, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 775. In Gomberg, the same attorney
represented three defendants charged with arson. Id. at 310-11, 342 N.E.2d at 552, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 772-73. Although all the defendants sought to discredit the testimony of the
state's witnesses, one of the defendants asserted an additional defense of lack of motive. Id.
at 310-11, 342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 772. The latter defendant was acquitted, but
the other two defendants were convicted of arson in the second degree. Id. at 311, 342
N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Appealing the convictions, one defendant claimed he
had been denied the effective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the lack of motive
defense of one defendant shifted the blame to the third defendant and himself, and that the
lawyer failed to call witnesses in his behalf and did not effectively cross-examine the other
defendants. Id. at 311, 342 N.E.2d at 552, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 773. Gomberg's appeal was premised on the theory that should the court find that his codefendant was deprived of adequate legal representation, it should reach the same conclusion as to Gomberg and reverse
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v. Macerola,2 1 the Court of Appeals held that a trial court's failure
to make an inquiry mandates a new trial where the defendant can
establish "at least [a] significant possibility" of a conflict of
222
interest.
In Macerola, the two defendants were charged with burglary
and assault. One defendant was accused of burglary and accessory
to an assault inflicted by the second defendant. In addition to the
assault charge, the second defendant was charged with being an
accessory to the burglary. Prior to trial, the court did not make an
inquiry of the defendants, both represented by the same attorney,
to determine whether each defendant understood the hazards of
joint representation. Subsequently, each defendant was convicted
of burglary and assault. 22 31 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third
Department, reversed the burglary conviction of one defendant,
but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 24 At the Court of Appeals,
the defendants claimed that the joint representation deprived them
25
of their right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and ordered a
new trial.22 6 Writing for a divided Court,2 2 Judge Jasen initially observed that while joint representation does not per se violate the
right to effective assistance of counsel, 22 8 that right may be seriously undermined when one attorney represents multiple defendboth convictions. Id. at 312, 342 N.E.2d at 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a defendant's right to effective legal assistance may conflict with his right to employ his own choice of counsel, the Gomberg Court
held that "a Trial Judge has a duty to protect the right of an accused to effective assistance
of counsel." Id. at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 774. The Court emphasized that
where an attorney is representing more than one defendant, the trial court must satisfy itself
that each defendant's selection of counsel was the product of an informed choice. Id. at 313,
342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 774. Finding that the trial court made an adequate
inquiry into the existence of a conflict of interest, that the defendants were aware of the
possibility of a conflict and were advised of their ability to retain separate counsel at any
time a conflict arose, but instead chose to share counsel, the Court upheld the convictions
because the defendants had "waived any claim of possible prejudice resulting from the joint
representation." Id. at 316, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
-1 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979), rev'g sub nom. People v.
Letka, 60 App. Div. 2d 661, 400 N.Y.S.2d 196 (3d Dep't 1977).
222 47 N.Y.2d at 264, 391 N.E.2d at 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
Id. at 261, 391 N.E.2d at 991, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
22 Id. at 261, 391 N.E.2d at 991-92, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
22 Id. at 261-62, 391 N.E.2d at 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 909-10.
22 Id. at 262, 391 N.E.2d at 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
The majority consisted of Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler and Fuschberg. Judge
Gabrielli wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke concurred.
22 Id. (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978) and People v. Gonzalez, 30
N.Y.2d 28, 34, 280 N.E.2d 882, 885, 330 N.Y.S.2d 54, 59, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972)).
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ants in the same action.29 To prevent erosion of the right, the
Macerola Court reasoned that a trial court has the duty to protect
the rights of defendants who are "often unschooled in the nature of
criminal proceedings" by inquiring on the record whether each
jointly represented defendant is aware of the possible conflicts of
interest that might arise.20 Where there is no inquiry on the record,
the Court determined that reversal is not mandated in every case,
since joint representation sometimes might be justified and therefore would not interfere with the right to counsel. Only where the
defendant can demonstrate an actual or possible conflict of interest, according to Judge Jasen, will the trial court's failure to inquire necessitate a new trial. 1 Addressing the facts in Macerola,
the Court found that any defense offered by counsel on behalf of
one client incriminated the other defendant, which established a
2
possible conflict of interest.

Judge Gabrielli dissented, claiming that there was no conflict
of interest between the defendants or their defenses.m Observing
that a defendant's right to conflict-free assistance of counsel must
be balanced against the right to be represented by an attorney of
one's choice, which is "of equal importance," Judge Gabrielli emphasized that trial courts should not "lightly interfer[e] with" a
defendant's selection of counsel.234 While the dissent agreed with
the majority's assertion that a reversal is not necessary in every
2n 47 N.Y.2d at 262, 391 N.E.2d at 992, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (citing People v. Gomberg,
38 N.Y.2d 307, 312, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1975) (citing Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942))).
m 47 N.Y.2d at 263, 391 N.E.2d at 992-93, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (citations omitted); see
People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 313-14, 342 N.E.2d at 553-54, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75; note
220 and accompanying text supra. Judge Jasen explained that the inquiry must be on the
record to enable the appellate court to ascertain whether the defendant "knowingly and intelligently" elected to proceed with an attorney who also is representing a codefendant. 47
N.Y.2d at 264, 391 N.E.2d at 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
*' 47 N.Y.2d at 264, 391 N.E.2d at 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
11 Id. at 264-65, 391 N.E.2d at 994, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 912. The Court observed that by
establishing a defense for either defendant on either charge, the attorney impliedly attributed the liability to the other defendant. Id. Moreover, the Court determined that the need
of each defendant to have his own independent counsel was more urgent in this case because
the defendants were charged with accessorial liability. Id. at 265, 391 N.E.2d at 994, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 912; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1975). Judge Jasen's assertion
about accessorial liability directly contrasts with the Court's earlier statement in People v.
Gonzalez, 30 N.Y.2d 28, 33, 280 N.E.2d 882, 885, 330 N.Y.S.2d 54, 58-59, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 859 (1972).
21 47 N.Y.2d at 266, 391 N.E.2d at 995, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
,11 Id. at 267, 391 N.E.2d at 995, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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case where the trial court fails to make the required inquiry, 3 it
maintained that in Macerola there was no showing that the defendants were prejudiced by the joint representation231 The dissent premised its conclusion on the view that the defendants had the same
interest in establishing a common defense and would have gained
nothing by proceeding with separate counsel.237 According to Judge
Gabrielli, "[a]ctual, not imagined, conflict of interest must be
shown before a defendant may successfully claim that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel." ' s
Perhaps the Macerola decision can be viewed best as a warning to the trial courts that if the duty to inquire on the record is
disregarded, a new trial will be ordered on the mere showing of a
"significant possibility" of a conflict of interest. Although the trial
court inquiry can not always inform the defendant adequately of
all the conflicting interests that might occur during the course of
joint representation,' 9 the Macerola Court nevertheless stressed the
Id. at 268, 391 N.E.2d at 996, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). Judge
Gabrielli observed that since the trial court must refrain from interfering with the attorneyclient relationship, the inquiry "necessarily [will] be limited in scope" so that the mere failure to inquire cannot be considered absolute grounds for reversal. Id. (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
21 Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
27 Id. (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 268-69, 391 N.E.2d at 996, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent noted that the only conflict mentioned by the majority was that
the jury "might" have been persuaded that Macerola was not as culpable on the assault
charge "if" the attorney had concentrated on showing that Macerola's codefendant was
mainly responsible for the injuries. Id. at 269, 391 N.E.2d at 996, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 914
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Unlike the majority, see note 232 supra,
Judge Gabrielli claimed that such a defense tactic would not have aided Macerola since the
defendants had been prosecuted on a theory of accessorial liability. 47 N.Y.2d at 269, 391
N.E.2d at 996, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
219In People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975), the
Court noted some of the difficulties the trial court is faced with in ensuring that the defendant knowingly chose joint representation. For example, since the inquiry takes place before
trial, the court is not aware of the evidence that will be introduced, the strategies that will
be followed, and the possible defenses that could be asserted. Id. at 314, 342 N.E.2d at 554,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 775. Some commentators have expressed doubt about whether a defendant
is capable of making an informed decision despite the trial court inquiry. See Geer, supra
note 217, at 141-42; Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal
Trial: The Court's Headache,5 HOFsTRA L. RE;. 315, 334 (1977); Lowenthal, supra note 217,
at 980-82. It has also been argued that many defendants, regardless of their degree of sophistication, do not understand the consequences of joint representation, and since the judge has
no knowledge of the trial tactics or defenses that the lawyer has discussed with his clients,
the judge is not in a position to advise the defendant adequately of the risks. See Geer, supra
note 217, at 142; Lowenthal, supra note 217, at 982.
The Gomberg Court stated that in performing its duty of inquiry, the trial court "may
place great weight on" counsel's assertions that no conflicts of interest are involved in the
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necessity of the inquiry, since it is the only means whereby an appellate court can ascertain whether the defendant's
choice of coun'240
sel was made "knowingly and intelligently.
The Macerola decision also serves as an example of the Court's
increased sensitivity to the conflicts inherent in joint representation and the continued effort to shield defendants from unwittingly
pursuing that course.24' The Court's emphasis on the inquiry, however, indicates a willingness to rely on an approach that has been
conceded to be inadequate as a method for alerting defendants to
the possible conflicts that may occur.24 2 It seems questionable,
therefore, whether by a pre-trial inquiry a defendant waives all
conflicts that may arise at trial. Through an inquiry and presumed
waiver before trial, a defendant may be said to opt for joint repre23
sentation in order to obtain the tactical advantages it provides.
As a result of the waiver, he also assumes the risk of conflicts native to joint representation, including actual conflicts that may develop. 24 It is submitted, however, that a defendant does not assume the risk of unexpected or unanticipated conflicts, for which
joint representation and that his clients consented to joint representation after he had disclosed all the risks. 38 N.Y.2d at 314, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 775; see ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-16, DR 5-101(A), DR 5-105(B), DR 5-105(C); ABA
STANDARDS, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5(B) (1974). Unfortunately, however, the attorney
often is unaware of potential conflicts of interest, so that reliance on counsel will not guarantee that a conflict may not develop later. See People v. Byrne, 17 N.Y.2d 209, 215, 217
N.E.2d 23, 25, 270 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1966); Gear, supra note 217, at 145; Hyman, supra, at
334. Furthermore, it has been observed that the economic incentives to lawyers representing
multiple clients make it unrealistic to believe counsel is always competent to advise his
clients on potential conflicts. See Lowenthal, supra note 217, at 961-72.
243 47 N.Y.2d at 264, 391 N.E.2d at 993, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 911; note 230 supra.
244 See note 232 supra.
2

See note 239 supra.

See note 237 and accompanying text supra.
By virtue of the defendant's decision after the inquiry to proceed with an attorney
representing codefendants, both the attorney and the defendant should be aware that certain conflicts may arise and indeed may be unavoidable. But cf. authorities cited in note 239
supra (attorney and trial judge may not advise defendant of all risks). For example, the
attorney will be precluded from exonerating one defendant at the expense of another,
thereby forfeiting additional defenses and adequate cross-examination of a defendant who
takes the stand. Similarly, although a defendant may profit from attempting to establish a
common defense, his case may suffer from guilt by association or the inability of counsel to
individualize adequately the defenses of his clients. See generally note 217 supra. In order to
maintain the validity of the waiver, it is necessary to assume that the inquiry, coupled with
an attorney's admonitions, is at least adequate to alert the defendant to those conflicts common to joint representation. It is submitted, therefore, that such unavoidable conflicts are
waived by an adequate inquiry, since the defendant seemingly prefers to disregard the apparent drawbacks of joint representation and instead chooses to rely on the tactical advantages accruing to him by virtue of a joint defense.
23
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the inquiry may be deemed inadequate and thus the waiver ineffective. 45 Should such a conflict occur, a defendant should be granted
a new trial, since his waiver may not be considered the product of
an "informed decision, ' 4 which is "depend[ent], in each case,
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case. 2 4 7 The waiver should retain its validity, however, for any pos211

When a defendant can show an actual conflict that was unanticipated at the time of

inquiry it is submitted that the defendant did not accept the risk of this type of conflict and
therefore could not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to separate counsel. Generally, a defendant can only waive his right to the assistance of counsel if the waiver was made
knowingly and intelligently. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468
(1938). Where a Gomberg waiver is involved, in order to preclude a claim of ineffective legal
assistance on appeal, the waiver must reflect an "informed decision" on the part of the defendant to proceed with joint counsel. 38 N.Y.2d at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 774
(citations omitted).
2,1 People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d at 313, 342 N.E.2d at 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 774 (citations omitted).
2" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). It is clear that a defendant may establish an invalid waiver because there was merely a pro forma inquiry at the trial level, see
People v. Dell, 60 App. Div. 2d 18, 21, 400 N.Y.S.2d 236, 238-39 (4th Dep't 1977), or because
the attorney rather than the defendant assented to the joint representation, see id. The validity of a waiver before trial of actual conflicts, however, remains unclear. While the Gorberg Court seemed to indicate that a waiver would foreclose establishment of prejudice arising from a conflict, see 38 N.Y.2d at 316, 342 N.E.2d at 555, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 777, the Court
did not indicate whether this should apply to all types of conflicts.
One commentator has noted that the dynamic nature of the criminal trial precludes
informed decision-making on the part of the defendant. See Geer, supra note 217, at 141-45.
Situations may arise when a defendant is suddenly and suprisingly confronted by a codefendant's damaging testimony which the attorney is unable or unwilling to contradict. A
shift in defense strategies may cause new and inconsistent defenses to surface. The defendant himself may refrain from revealing potential conflicts to his attorney in order to protect
a codefendant. Surprise witnesses presented by the prosecutor also may present unplanned
testimony and pose new conflicts. See id. at 145. Since the inquiry was promulgated primarily to protect the unwary defendant from damaging and otherwise unnecessary conflicts, it
seems a harsh measure to bind him to a waiver that did not contemplate these contingencies. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that "[the Court] indulge[s] [in] every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942).
In order that these unwaived conflicts be avoided before their damaging effects are reflected in a conviction, the trial judge may consider severing the joint representation in the
midst of trial, even if it is against the desires of the defendant. The Court of Appeals has
held that the right to waive counsel is not absolute but is subject to certain limitations that
are necessary "to promote the orderly administration of justice and to prevent subsequent
attack on a verdict claiming a denial of fundamental fairness." People v. McIntyre, 36
N.Y.2d 10, 17, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844 (1974). Indeed, it has been held
that a court may deny the defendant's request to continue with his attorney if the representation might deprive the defendant of effective assistance of counsel. People v. Hall, 46
N.Y.2d 873, 875, 387 N.E.2d 610, 611, 414 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 97
(1979) (per curiam). In Hall, over the objections of the defendant, the trial court granted an
order disqualifying his counsel when it was discovered that the attorney formerly had repre-
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sible or actual conflicts that could be reasonably expected, even
though unknown, in order that the inquiry remains a viable alternative to needless reversals for properly obtained convictions.2 4
PatriciaA. O'Malley

Court of Appeals extends attenuation doctrine to include evidence
disclosed by a defendant within seconds of an illegal seizure
To effectuate the fourth amendment's 429 prohibition of unrea-

sonable searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule mandates that
evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of an illegal search
or seizure may not be used as proof against the victim of the search
or seizure.2so Evidence so obtained may be admitted, however, if
sented an identification witness for the prosecution. Id. at 874, 387 N.E.2d at 610, 414
N.Y.S.2d at 678-79. The Court of Appeals upheld the order since "it appeared very likely
that [the attorney's] continuance in the case would work unfair prejudice either to the prosecution or to the defendant." Id. at 875, 387 N.E.2d at 611, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 679; see People v.
Huggard, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1979, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
21M In People v. Ortiz, 49 N.Y.2d 718, 402 N.E.2d 139, 425 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1980), the Court
of Appeals found that a defendant who waived his right to separate counsel at an inquiry
could not later "contend that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because of
a possible conflict of interest arising from [his] joint representation." Id. at 719, 402 N.E.2d
at 140, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
219 The fourth amendment provides in part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, see N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 12.
20 The Supreme Court first enunciated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 392, 398 (1914), where it proscribed using letters and records illegally obtained
by federal officials as evidence in federal courts. The rule was extended to state courts in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The primary goal of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct rather than
to protect the constitutional rights of the victim of the illegal search or seizure. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 388, 347-48 (1974); People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12,
31, 385 N.E.2d 541, 550, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 810-11 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
The mandate of Mapp was first complied with by the New York Court of Appeals in People
v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 371, 374, 179 N.E.2d 478, 481, 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465, 467
(1961), overruled in part, People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 237, 221 N.E.2d 550, 274 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1966), and has been consistently followed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 130-32, 347 N.E.2d 575, 582, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221-220 (1976); People
v. Williams, 37 N.Y.2d 206, 208, 333 N.E.2d 160, 160, 371 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1975).
Often referred to as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), the exclusionary rule not only proscribes the use of unlawfully seized evidence, but also prohibits the police from using information obtained as a
result of their illegal conduct. Id. at 484-86; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920); People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 301, 196 N.E.2d 261, 262, 246

